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α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
Whether cultural practices that discriminate against women should be criminalized is an important consideration for policymakers. In this study, I show that, theoretically, legal prohibition may decrease women’s welfare, by analyzing one cultural practice called “levirate marriage,” which is widely observed in sub-Saharan Africa. According to this practice, because a widow is inherited by the brother or other male relative of her deceased husband, levirate marriage is often seen as a form of forced marriage. However, this practice is also anecdotally believed to provide social protection for widows, as they usually have limited property rights. According to the developed game-theoretic analysis, this practice is selected as an equilibrium when a widow’s other livelihood means are limited and her husband’s clan wishes to continue a family line through generations by keeping sons of the deceased within his extended family. In this equilibrium, the woman obtains her reservation utility plus the net information rent, which is given by the clan to encourage her to produce more sons during marriage. Legally prohibiting this practice makes it costly for the clan to provide this information rent or even offer the levirate marriage. Because this information rent disappears, her welfare may decline. The present investigation serves as an important caution for those who propose an outright ban on an anti-social practice that is seen as violating women’s human rights.