CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2013
Volume: 48
Issue: 3
Pages: 887-917

Authors (2)

Kumar, Praveen (University of Houston) Rabinovitch, Ramon (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using a unique data set with detailed information on the derivative positions of upstream oil and gas firms during 1996–2008, we find that hedging intensity is positively related to factors that amplify chief executive officer (CEO) entrenchment and free cash flow agency costs. There is also robust evidence that hedging is motivated by the reduction of financial distress and borrowing costs, and that it is influenced by both intrinsic cash flow risk and temporary spikes in commodity price volatility. We present a comprehensive perspective on the determinants of corporate hedging, and the results are consistent with the predictions of the risk management and agency costs literatures.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:03:p:887-917_00
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25