A universal construction generating potential games

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2018
Volume: 108
Issue: C
Pages: 331-340

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain “facilities.” All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a “trimness” condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games with structured utilities, all facilities are trim. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:331-340
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25