Prime (information) brokerage

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 137
Issue: 2
Pages: 371-391

Authors (4)

Kumar, Nitish (Rutgers University-Newark) Mullally, Kevin (not in RePEc) Ray, Sugata (not in RePEc) Tang, Yuehua (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that hedge funds gain an information advantage from their prime broker banks regarding the banks’ corporate borrowers. The connected hedge funds make abnormally large trades in the stocks of borrowing firms prior to loan announcements, and these trades outperform other trades. The outperformance is particularly strong for trades of hedge funds that have high revenue potential for prime broker banks. These informed trades appear to be based on information not just about the loan itself but also about firms’ fundamentals such as future earnings. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that equity analysts inside the banks are one potential conduit of information transfer.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:137:y:2020:i:2:p:371-391
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25