Backward induction in games without perfect recall

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2020
Volume: 124
Issue: C
Pages: 207-218

Authors (2)

Hillas, John (not in RePEc) Kvasov, Dmitriy (Waseda University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), while formally well defined in a wider class of games, are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:207-218
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25