Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Law and Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 57
Issue: S3
Pages: S67 - S100

Authors (3)

Orley Ashenfelter (Princeton University) Daniel Hosken (not in RePEc) Matthew Weinberg (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork's views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork's recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork's proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/675862
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24