Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 121
Issue: 3
Pages: 390-394

Authors (2)

Landeo, Claudia M. (University of Alberta) Spier, Kathryn E. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:390-394
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25