Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2012
Volume: 106
Issue: 3
Pages: 614-634

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the US mortgage crisis. Real estate-related assets are overvalued in banks' balance sheets, especially those of bigger banks, compared to the market value of these assets. Banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:106:y:2012:i:3:p:614-634
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25