When the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil: Exploiting one's nuisance power

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2012
Volume: 56
Issue: 8
Pages: 1593-1606

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In this paper, a lobby group or union may influence public policy because it is able, via a costly signal such as a boycott or a strike, to negatively impact the image of decision makers. The competence of a government is measured by its ability to do a lot with only a little money. Voters receive, through observing the level of public output, only a noisy signal of government's quality so that the lobby groups, which are better informed, may transmit to them more precise information about it.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:8:p:1593-1606
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25