Insurers’ Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2015
Volume: 97
Issue: 2
Pages: 314-331

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

By influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers by analyzing how increases in insurer size resulting from the implementation of Medicare Part D affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 3.7 percentage. The external commercial market savings amount to $1.5 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the internal cost savings of newly insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to a greater than 9.25 percentage average increase in profitability on stand-alone drug insurance. © 2015 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:97:y:2015:i:2:p:314-331
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25