Parallel imports and price controls

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 39
Issue: 2
Pages: 378-402

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research‐intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and show, to the contrary, that the pace of innovation often is faster in a world with international exhaustion of intellectual property rights than in one with national exhaustion. The key to our conclusion is to recognize that governments will make different choices of price controls when parallel imports are allowed by their trade partners than they will when they are not.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:2:p:378-402
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25