Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2012
Volume: 76
Issue: 1
Pages: 131-159

Authors (2)

Elmaghraby, Wedad J. (not in RePEc) Larson, Nathan (American University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Bidders often face avoidable fixed costs or other synergies that can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or a preference to avoid volatility, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding difficult in different ways. We find that measures of ‘difficulty’ provide a consistent explanation of deviations from best response bidding across the three formats.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:131-159
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25