Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 68
Issue: 4
Pages: 737-779

Authors (4)

Matthias Hunold (not in RePEc) Kai Hüschelrath (not in RePEc) Ulrich Laitenberger (École d'Ingénieurs Télécom Par...) Johannes Muthers (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. Using a rich micro‐level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. We find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers. Moreover, the transport distance also varies in the ratio of capacity relative to demand, but only if firms compete and not when they coordinate their sales. We provide a theoretical model of spatial competition with capacity constraints that rationalizes the empirical results.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:68:y:2020:i:4:p:737-779
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25