Bait and Switch.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1995
Volume: 103
Issue: 4
Pages: 813-30

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Sellers sometimes practice a form of false advertising known as bait and switch. A low-priced good is advertised but replaced by a different good at the showroom. The practice is surprising since advertising the wrong good discourages the appropriate buyers from shopping, attracting customers who will be disappointed when they see the good. Firms bait and switch to draw a greater number of shoppers. The cost is that some who would have bought the good that is for sale may not bother to look. Under a variety of conditions, bait and switch is a profitable strategy resulting in a fully rational equilibrium with false advertising. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:103:y:1995:i:4:p:813-30
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25