Pay Equality and Industrial Politics.

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 1989
Volume: 97
Issue: 3
Pages: 561-80

Authors (1)

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers. But it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme. However, when workers' rewards are based on relative comparisons, salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm. Relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected. The major result is that, within the relevant groups, some wage compression is efficient. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:3:p:561-80
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25