Borrowing in an Illegal Market: Contracting with Loan Sharks

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 2025
Volume: 107
Issue: 1
Pages: 269-278

Authors (4)

Kevin Lang (Boston University) Kaiwen Leong (not in RePEc) Huailu Li (Fudan University) Haibo Xu (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using over 11,000 unlicensed loans to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore, we provide basic information about an understudied market: illegal moneylending. Borrowers and lenders interact frequently and rely primarily on relational contracts to enforce their agreements. Borrowers have high discount rates, often have gambling and/or substance abuse problems, and often repay late. While lenders sometimes resort to nonfinancial punishments, the primary cost of late repayment is the compounding of a very high interest rate. Consistent with our view that lenders cannot extract all surplus, a crackdown on illegal lending raised interest rates and lowered the size of loans.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:107:y:2025:i:1:p:269-278
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25