Economics at the FTC: Fraud, Mergers and Exclusion

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 47
Issue: 4
Pages: 371-398

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Economists at the Federal Trade Commission engage in economic analysis of a diverse set of behaviors, practices, and policies in support of the agency’s consumer protection and competition missions as demonstrated by the four projects that are the focus of this article. Consumer protection economists provided economic analysis in the first two projects discussed, which both involve fraud. However, one of the projects was an enforcement action, and the other was a pure research project. The final two projects are antitrust matters: a proposed merger of software firms; and a case that was brought to stop anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York (outside the USA) 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:47:y:2015:i:4:p:371-398
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
6
Added to Database
2026-01-25