Ending civil wars through fraudulent elections

C-Tier
Journal: Oxford Economic Papers
Year: 2024
Volume: 76
Issue: 1
Pages: 250-266

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Previous research finds a positive association between electoral fraud and post-election protests, violence, and civil conflict. This article contends that the effect of electoral fraud on peace can be heterogeneous. I investigate elections after civil wars that stalemated. My contribution is to present a theory and suggestive evidence that, in this context, electoral fraud by unpopular incumbents can be peace-promoting. An important policy implication is that international efforts to prevent electoral fraud (e.g. electoral observers), in this specific setting, may increase the odds that a civil war continues.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:oxecpp:v:76:y:2024:i:1:p:250-266.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25