Can changes in disability insurance work incentives influence beneficiary employment? Evidence from the promoting opportunity demonstration

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2025
Volume: 245
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Levere, Michael (Colgate University) Wittenburg, David (not in RePEc) Jones, John T. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study how disability beneficiary work behavior responds to a rule change that replaces a cash cliff—a threshold above which benefits reduce to zero—with a benefit offset ramp—where benefits are gradually phased out. Using a randomized controlled trial with over 10,000 Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries who voluntarily enrolled in the demonstration, we find precisely estimated null effects on earnings, income, and benefit amounts. An analysis of mechanisms indicates that administrative burden, the limited size of the incentive, and individual and systemic barriers to employment for people with disabilities likely contributed to the limited impacts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:245:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725000684
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25