Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 126
Issue: C
Pages: 171-175

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study optimal dynamic compliance decisions in an uncertain environment. Contrary to the static literature, greater uncertainty affects consumption, not the optimal tax evasion rule. Thus, audit and sanctions rather than fiscal uncertainty should be used to control tax evasion.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:171-175
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25