Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 106
Issue: 3
Pages: 177-179

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:177-179
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25