Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions

B-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Year: 2012
Volume: 4
Issue: 3
Pages: 1-33

Authors (3)

Thomas J. Holmes (not in RePEc) David K. Levine (Washington University in St. L...) James A. Schmitz (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Arrow (1962) argued that since a monopoly restricts output relative to a competitive industry, it would be less willing to pay a fixed cost to adopt a new technology. We develop a new theory of why a monopolistic industry innovates less. Firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some cases, upon adoption of technology, firms must temporarily reduce output. We call such problems switchover disruptions. A cost of adoption, then, is the forgone rents on the sales of lost or delayed production, and these opportunity costs are larger the higher the price on those lost units. (JEL D21, D42, L12, L14, O32, O33)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejmic:v:4:y:2012:i:3:p:1-33
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25