Grandchild care and eldercare. A quid pro quo arrangement

C-Tier
Journal: Economic Modeling
Year: 2025
Volume: 146
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Lefebvre, Mathieu (Bureau d'Économie Théorique et...) Pestieau, Pierre (not in RePEc) Schoenmaeckers, Jérôme (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The phenomenon of grandparents assuming the role of caretakers for their grandchildren is substantial and on the rise; a trend partially attributed to mothers’ increased participation in the workforce. While altruism is commonly assumed to be the primary driver behind such caregiving, we examine an additional motivation: the expectation among grandparents that they will receive care from their offspring in the event of their own incapacity. This study investigates this hypothesis from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Initially, we construct a theoretical framework, delineating a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium model wherein the grandparent first commits to caring for the grandchild, followed by anticipation of receiving care from their adult child in disability scenarios. Subsequently, we empirically test the feasibility of this model by analysing data sourced from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Our results confirm that elderly parents who cared for their grandchildren received more support from their children in the case of a loss of autonomy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecmode:v:146:y:2025:i:c:s026499932500001x
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25