Cold play: Learning across bimatrix games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2021
Volume: 185
Issue: C
Pages: 419-441

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn ‘across games’ by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games. Each agent’s individual solution concept is represented by a computer program, and natural selection is applied to derive a stochastically stable solution concept. Our aim is to develop a theory predicting how experienced agents would play in one-shot games. To use the theory, visit https://gplab.nhh.no/gamesolver.php.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:185:y:2021:i:c:p:419-441
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25