Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2010
Volume: 100
Issue: 5
Pages: 2125-56

Authors (2)

Christopher Avery (not in RePEc) Jonathan Levin (Stanford University)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Early admissions are widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm. (JEL C78, I23)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:5:p:2125-56
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25