When the threat is stronger than the execution: trade and welfare under oligopoly

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2021
Volume: 52
Issue: 3
Pages: 471-495

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We compare the effects of changes in trade costs on trade volumes and on the gains from trade under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In both cases, the threshold trade costs below which the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm's behavior is the same; and welfare is U‐shaped under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition; for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a “van‐der‐Rohe Region”; and, for even higher trade costs, there exists a “Nimzowitsch Region”, where welfare is higher under Bertrand competition even though no trade takes place.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:3:p:471-495
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25