Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
Year: 2020
Volume: 52
Issue: 2-3
Pages: 549-582

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints, and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristics of the credit crunches observed in the data.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:jmoncb:v:52:y:2020:i:2-3:p:549-582
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25