Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 124
Issue: 2
Pages: 185-187

Authors (2)

Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis (not in RePEc) Lensink, Robert (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:185-187
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25