Reciprocal, but inequality averse as well? Mixed motives for punishment and reward

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2023
Volume: 210
Issue: C
Pages: 91-116

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Considerable experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity and inequality aversion are important motivations to understand deviations from self-interested behavior, and in particular costly punishment and reward. We use a within-subject experimental design to evaluate the share of subjects whose second-party reward and punishment choices are best accounted for by pure reciprocity, pure inequality aversion, a mixture of these two motives, or other motivations like altruism or competitiveness. We find that the largest fraction of punishment and rewards is motivated by a mixture of both inequality aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequality aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provide new insights into the literature on other-regarding preferences and may help to organize some results in the experimental literature on second-party punishment and reward.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:210:y:2023:i:c:p:91-116
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25