An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2012
Volume: 84
Issue: 3
Pages: 753-766

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper explores the motivations behind punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subjects design in ten simple games. We apply a classification analysis and find that a parsimonious model assuming that subjects are either inequity averse or selfish best explains the pattern of punishment from both third and second parties. Despite their unaffected position, we find that many third parties do not punish in an impartial or normative manner.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:84:y:2012:i:3:p:753-766
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25