Delegated Monitoring, Institutional Ownership, and Corporate Misconduct Spillovers

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Year: 2023
Volume: 58
Issue: 4
Pages: 1547-1581

Authors (3)

Lel, Ugur (University of Georgia) Martin, Gerald S. (not in RePEc) Qin, Zhongling (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:cup:jfinqa:v:58:y:2023:i:4:p:1547-1581_5
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25