Patent Quality and a Two-Tiered Patent System

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 62
Issue: 3
Pages: 503-540

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

type="main"> <p>In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, ‘gold-plate’ patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:62:y:2014:i:3:p:503-540
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24