When financial incentives backfire: Evidence from a community health worker experiment in Uganda

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2020
Volume: 144
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Wagner, Zachary (not in RePEc) Asiimwe, John Bosco (not in RePEc) Levine, David I. (University of California-Berke...)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

There is growing support for an entrepreneurial community health worker (CHW) model, but the benefits of such a design are unclear. We randomly assigned CHWs in Uganda to sell treatment for child diarrhea door-to-door and retain the profits or to deliver treatment to homes for free. We find that, despite stronger financial incentives, the entrepreneurial model led to substantially less effort (fewer household visits) than the free delivery model. Qualitative evidence suggests that selling had a social penalty whereas free distribution was socially rewarding. Our results call into question the notion that an entrepreneurial model necessarily increases CHW effort relative to free distribution.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:144:y:2020:i:c:s0304387819307801
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25