Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 7
Pages: 2210-37

Authors (3)

Nava Ashraf (not in RePEc) Erica Field (not in RePEc) Jean Lee (World Bank Group)

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psycho-social cost of making contraceptives more concealable.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:7:p:2210-37
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25