Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2016
Volume: 96
Issue: C
Pages: 18-29

Authors (2)

Li, Jian (Iowa State University) Zhou, Junjie (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Blackwell (1951, 1953) proposes an informativeness ranking of experiments: experiment I is more Blackwell-informative than experiment II if and only if the value of experiment I is higher than that of experiment II for all expected-utility maximizers. Under commitment and reduction, our main theorem shows that Blackwell equivalence holds for all convex and strongly monotone preferences—i.e., uncertainty-averse preferences (Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2011b), which nest most ambiguity-averse preferences commonly used in applications as special cases.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:96:y:2016:i:c:p:18-29
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25