Ownership of property-rights and the allocation of talents

C-Tier
Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 41
Issue: 26
Pages: 3425-3436

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Under the reserve-clause system that assigns the property-rights on the Major League Baseball players' services to teams, player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players. In contrast, under the current free-agency system, players with free-agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors. Thus, the system assigns the property-rights to players. Using data extracted from the Baseball Archive (http://baseball1.com), this article examines the effect of the change in the property-rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams. We find that the change increased large-market teams' shares of veteran all-star players and the concentration of senior players.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:taf:applec:v:41:y:2009:i:26:p:3425-3436
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25