Tacit collusion among dominant banks: Evidence from round-yard loan pricing

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance
Year: 2025
Volume: 92
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Chan, Yu-Ju (not in RePEc) Lin, Chih-Yung (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung ...) Lin, Tse-Chun (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that approximately 70 % of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude using round yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with borrowers. Tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of round yard priced loans than of non-round yard priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up loans to multiple yards rather than rounding them down. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and nonrepeat borrowers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:corfin:v:92:y:2025:i:c:s0929119925000185
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25