Rational Inattention and Portfolio Selection

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2007
Volume: 62
Issue: 4
Pages: 1999-2040

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Costly information acquisition makes it rational for investors to obtain important economic news with only limited frequency or limited accuracy. We show that this rational inattention to important news may make investors over‐ or underinvest. In addition, the optimal trading strategy is “myopic” with respect to future news frequency and accuracy. We find that the optimal news frequency is nonmonotonic in news accuracy and investment horizon. Furthermore, when both news frequency and news accuracy are endogenized, an investor with a higher risk aversion or a longer investment horizon chooses less frequent but more accurate periodic news updates.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:1999-2040
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25