Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2002
Volume: 69
Issue: 1
Pages: 209-244

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment, and test the model using data from three Indian villages. We find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income, but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:1:p:209-244
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25