On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2018
Volume: 170
Issue: C
Pages: 66-70

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a canonical multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) information can be arbitrarily correlated, (ii) senders reveal information simultaneously, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This paper constructs examples that demonstrate that adding senders can result in a loss of information if any of these assumptions is violated.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:170:y:2018:i:c:p:66-70
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25