Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk taking

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 96
Issue: 3
Pages: 485-512

Authors (4)

Houston, Joel F. (not in RePEc) Lin, Chen (University of Hong Kong) Lin, Ping (not in RePEc) Ma, Yue (City University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jfinec:v:96:y:2010:i:3:p:485-512
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25