Status and incentives

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 39
Issue: 1
Pages: 305-326

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This article introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. This is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status be decreased. Higher‐status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better‐paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status. The results are consistent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long‐term work relationship, juniors' compensation is delayed; and (iii) past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization's hierarchy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:305-326
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24