Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Development Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 127
Issue: C
Pages: 395-412

Authors (2)

Auriol, Emmanuelle (Toulouse School of Economics (...) Platteau, Jean-Philippe (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint, assuming that religious clerics can be co-opted by the ruler acting as an autocrat. The comparative effects of decentralized versus centralized religions on the optimal level of cooperation between the autocrat and the religious clerics, which itself impinges upon political stability, is analysed. The paper shows that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics makes autocratic regimes more unstable. It also shows that in time of stability, the level of reforms is larger with a centralized religion than with a decentralized one. When the autocrat in the decentralized case pushes more reforms than in the centralized one, he always does so at the cost of stability. Historical case studies are presented that serve to illustrate the main results.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:deveco:v:127:y:2017:i:c:p:395-412
Journal Field
Development
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24