On the optimal number of representatives

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2012
Volume: 153
Issue: 3
Pages: 419-445

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We propose a normative theory of the number of representatives based on a model of a representative democracy. We derive a formula giving the number of representatives as proportional to the square root of total population. Simple tests of the formula on a sample of a 100 countries yield good results. We then discuss the appropriateness of the number of representatives in some countries. It seems that the United States has too few representatives, while France and Italy have too many. The excess number of representatives matters: it is positively correlated with indicators of red tape and barriers to entrepreneurship. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:3:p:419-445
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24