Environmental protection for bureaucratic promotion: Water quality performance review of provincial governors in China

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Year: 2024
Volume: 128
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show including quantitative environmental targets for bureaucratic promotion incentivizes government officials to enforce environmental regulation but at significant economic costs. Taking advantage of the gradual expansion of China's water quality performance review (WQPR) over time and space, we find that WQPR significantly reduced ambient concentrations of criteria pollutants, digestive cancer mortality, and GDP growth rate. WQPR's effects are more pronounced along provincial borders, which are targeted by WQPR, and when provincial governors have more promotion potential. An important mechanism is investment in wastewater treatment facilities. There is evidence that WQPR passed the benefit-cost test, especially in rural areas.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeeman:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s0095069624001347
Journal Field
Environment
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25