Capital controls and trade policy

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Economics
Year: 2024
Volume: 151
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Lloyd, Simon P. (Bank of England) Marin, Emile A. (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

How does optimal capital-flow management change with prevailing trade policies? We study the joint optimal determination of capital controls and trade tariffs in a two-country, two-good model with trade in goods and assets. Because countries are large in both markets, a country-planner can achieve higher domestic welfare by departing from free trade in addition to levying capital controls, despite the cooperative optimal allocation being efficient. However, time variation in the optimal tariff induces households to over- or under-borrow through its effects on the path of the real exchange rate. As a result, optimal capital controls are generally smaller when trade policy is constrained (i.e., by a Free-Trade Agreement), but, absent retaliation, can be larger depending on the paths of underlying fundamentals.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:inecon:v:151:y:2024:i:c:s0022199624000928
Journal Field
International
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25