Optimal Hedging Strategies and Interactions between Firms

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2012
Volume: 21
Issue: 1
Pages: 79-129

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies corporate risk management in a context of financial constraints and imperfect competition in the product market. The paper shows that interactions between firms affect their hedging strategies. As a general rule, firms’ hedging demands decrease with the correlation between their internal funds and investment opportunities. Moreover, when a firm’s hedging demand is high in the case where investments are strategic substitutes, its hedging demand is low in the case where investments are strategic complements and vice versa.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:79-129
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25