Moral Hazard and Claims Deterrence in Private Disability Insurance

A-Tier
Journal: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Year: 2014
Volume: 6
Issue: 4
Pages: 110-41

Authors (3)

David Autor (Massachusetts Institute of Tec...) Mark Duggan (not in RePEc) Jonathan Gruber (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Exploiting within-firm, over-time variation in plan parameters for nearly 10,000 Long Term Disability (LTD) policies held by US employers, we present the first empirical analysis of the determinants of private LTD spells. We find that a shorter waiting period and a higher replacement rate increase the incidence of LTD spells. Sixty percent of the latter effect is due to the mechanical censoring of shorter spells, with the remainder due to the deterrence of spells that would have continued beyond the waiting period. Deterrence is driven primarily by a reduction in the incidence of shorter duration spells and less severe disabilities.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aejapp:v:6:y:2014:i:4:p:110-41
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24