The pernicious role of asymmetric history in negotiations

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 116
Issue: C
Pages: 430-438

Authors (5)

Dezső, Linda (not in RePEc) Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University) Steinhart, Jonathan (not in RePEc) Neszveda, Gábor (Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB)) Szászi, Barnabás (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.402 = (α=2.01 / 5 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The role of history in negotiations is a double-edged sword. Although parties can develop trust over time, there are also countless examples of protracted feuds that developed as a result of conflicting interpretations and invocations of history. We propose that, due to biased invocations of the past, history is likely to play a pernicious role in negotiations – particularly when given an asymmetric history in which one party benefited at the expense of the other. We test this prediction in two, two-stage experiments. We find that asymmetric history in a first stage leads to increased impasses in a second stage, but that this effect holds only when the second stage pairs the same two parties who shared the asymmetric history in the first.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:116:y:2015:i:c:p:430-438
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
5
Added to Database
2026-01-25