Regulatory Fragmentation

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Finance
Year: 2025
Volume: 80
Issue: 2
Pages: 1081-1126

Authors (3)

JOSEPH KALMENOVITZ (not in RePEc) MICHELLE LOWRY (Drexel University) EKATERINA VOLKOVA (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Regulatory fragmentation occurs when multiple federal agencies oversee a single issue. Using the full text of the Federal Register, the government's official daily publication, we provide the first systematic evidence on the extent and costs of regulatory fragmentation. Fragmentation increases the firm's costs while lowering its productivity, profitability, and growth. Moreover, it deters entry into an industry and increases the propensity of small firms to exit. These effects arise from redundancy and, more prominently, from inconsistencies between government agencies. Our results uncover a new source of regulatory burden, and we show that agency costs among regulators contribute to this burden.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jfinan:v:80:y:2025:i:2:p:1081-1126
Journal Field
Finance
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25